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 Abstract 
The sugar sector is one of the most heavily protected commodities in agriculture using a system 
of tariff rate quotas (TRQs) with a complex set of administration procedures.  General 
equilibrium models are not suitable to analyze trade liberalization scenarios that involve 
numerous tariff-rate quotas across narrowly defined product lines.  We use the 
Rutherford/Grant/Hertel modeling approach by embedding a detailed, partial equilibrium (PE) 
model into a standard, global general equilibrium (GE) framework. We use this PE/GE model to 
compare trade and welfare outcomes of two liberalization scenarios: Increasing quota levels by 
25% and cutting over tariffs by 50%, versus increasing quota levels by 50% and cutting over-
quota tariffs by 25%. We find that lowering over-quota tariffs relatively more has more positive 





For 60 years agricultural trade policies have increased in complexity, making the analysis of 
trade liberalization a formidable task for policy makers.  The international sugar sector is no 
exception. This sector includes some of the most heavily protected commodities in agriculture. 
The Uruguay Round (UR) of multilateral trade negotiations brought agriculture under the 
disciplines of the GATT in 1994 and required WTO members to convert non-tariff barriers into 
tariffs through a process known as tariffication.  Many developed countries had to convert their 
non-tariff barriers into systems of tariff rate quotas (TRQs) with a complex set of administration 
procedures.  For this reason, trade liberalization results from general equilibrium analyses 
involving numerous tariff-rate quotas across narrowly defined product lines run into major 
difficulties that limit the scope and accuracy of their results (Grant, Hertel and Rutherford 2008; 
Bureau and Salvatici, 2003). 
 
To bring further reform to agricultural trade, WTO members initiated the Doha Development 
Agenda (DDA) in 2001.  Although this round of negotiations intends to address reform in 
domestic support and export competition, market access has been a key focus in the negotiations.  
In addition to reducing tariffs, two central market access issues being debated in the on-going 
though currently dormant Doha Round of WTO negotiations are the option to allow a percentage 
of total agricultural tariff lines to be considered as sensitive and, only for the developing 
countries, the option to declare a share of tariff lines as special (WTO, 2008).  The sensitive and 
special lines are intended to undergo lower or no cuts from the current bound levels.  Products 
subject to TRQs in a country’s tariff schedule are generally considered those most politically 
sensitive and/or economically vulnerable to tariff cuts.  It is therefore reasonable to assume that 
these products, such as sugar, will fall under either the sensitive or the special category.    
 
Under the July 2008 Chairman’s text (WTO, 2008), developed countries would be allowed to 
declare between 4-6 percent of their total tariff lines as being sensitive.  The products declared to 
be sensitive would incur lower tariff cuts (1/3 to 2/3 of formula cut) and be required to provide 
additional market access under a TRQ (3-6 percent of domestic consumption).  If the United 
States were to declare sugar to be sensitive, the current size of the TRQ would have to be 
expanded, while sugar tariffs would undergo a smaller cut than the agreed upon formula cut.  
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 Since TRQs are established at a disaggregated tariff-line level, any analysis that uses tariffs at the 
aggregated level will fail to accurately capture the potential impacts from the suggested reform 
modalities. 
 
Computable general equilibrium (CGE) models, such as the Global Trade Analysis Project 
(GTAP) model, are one of the most commonly used tools in analyses of DDA market access 
reform scenarios.  However, to remain tractable these models typically require considerable 
aggregation across product lines, across different policy instruments, and across regions. This 
aggregation tends to obscure the heterogeneity in protection instruments, including tariff rate 
variations across tariff lines as well as difference between over- and in-quota rates. To address 
these concerns, Grant, Hertel, and Rutherford (2006) extended general equilibrium analysis to 
the “tariff line” by embedding a detailed, partial equilibrium (PE) model into a standard, global 
general equilibrium (GE) framework and this combination we call a PE/GE model. In their first 
PE/GE approach they chose the global dairy sector, which is also characterized by numerous 
tariff line level specifications. Utilizing a mixed-complementarity formulation they were able to 
more accurately represent the workings of bilateral and multilateral dairy trade policy.  Their 
analysis examined the impact of liberalizing U.S. dairy imports via expansion of bilateral and 
multilateral tariff rate quotas, as well as reductions in out-of-quota tariffs.  
 
In this study, we adopt the PE/GE approach of Grant, Hertel and Rutherford (2006) to investigate 
the trade and welfare implications of liberalizing U.S. raw sugar market access policy.  Previous 
studies have focused on raw sugar TRQs using the GTAP model (Elbehri et al. 2004; van der 
Messenbrugghe, Beghin and Mitchell 2003).  This study adopts a mixed-complementarity 
framework similar to these studies.  However, what distinguishes this study from theirs and 
many others is: (a) the level of disaggregation embedded in the sub-sector (PE) model thereby 
allowing for an explicit evaluation of trade policy at the “tariff line” (the PE/GE approach); and 
(b) the treatment of bilateral trade to incorporate country-designated TRQ allocations between 
the U.S. and its major sugar suppliers.   
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 We continue by providing information on the sugar sector and U.S. sugar trade policy. We will 
then describe the model before we review the economics of tariff quotas. Two trade 
liberalization scenarios and their possible results will be presented before we conclude.  
 
Sugar—a widely traded and protected agricultural commodity 
Sugar—beet sugar or cane sugar—is produced in over 140 countries and more than 100 countries 
produce sugar cane. World production for the 2007/08-2009/10 average exceeded 150 million 
metric tons (MT), raw value, of which about one-third or 50 million MT were traded. Brazil is by 
far the largest producer, with about 33 million MT, two-thirds of which were exported. Other 
important producers and traders are India, the EU, China, and Thailand, which in 2007/08-
2009/10 exported 5.4 million MT of a 7 million MT production. The U.S. produced about 7 
million MT during that period and imported close to 2.5 million MT.  
 
U.S. sugar import policy 
The United States is the fourth largest importer of sugar and sugar containing products (Haley 
and Ali 2007).  In 2005/2006, the U.S. imported more than 3.1 million metric tons of raw and 
refined sugar (raw value), accounting for 7 percent of world trade. In 2009/2010, the imported 
amount was 2.2 million tons. Almost all raw sugar and other sugar containing products are 
regulated by TRQs.  (The minimum TRQ for raw cane sugar is 1,117,195 metric tons and the 
minimum TRQ for refined sugar is 22,000 metric tons ,USDA/FAS, 2007). Tariff rate quotas or 
TRQs are a two-tiered tariff system, whereby within a set quota a lower in-quota tariff is levied 
on imports, while imports exceeding the set quota amount are charged a higher over-quota tariff 
rate. Thus, the U.S. (and many other countries) has implemented a complex web of TRQ 
administrative procedures, which in addition to the high tariff rates can discourage trade. Quota 
administration can present special challenges in policy analysis because the estimated social 
welfare can vary depending on who gets the right to supply imports at the favorable in-quota 
tariff rate. 
 
The U.S. in-quota tariff for sugar is equal to 0.625 cents per pound. Most countries have the in-
quota tariff waived under either the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), the Caribbean 
Basin Initiative, or under other U.S. free trade agreements (Haley and Ali, 2007). The over-quota 
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 tariff is 15.36 cents per pound for raw sugar and 16.21 cents per pound for refined sugar (ERS, 
2009), which is high enough to constitute a de facto prohibitive tariff rate.  Based on the formula 
agreed upon by WTO members (WTO 2005), ad valorem conversions of U.S. most favored 
nation (MFN) sugar tariffs are presented in table 1.  As evident from this table, for a given 
import value, whether in-quota or over-quota tariff is levied can make a significant difference.  
As mentioned, tariff rates can further vary across exporting countries based on their special trade 
arrangements with the U.S. government.  Therefore, bilateral import tariffs are used in this 
analysis rather than the MFN tariffs presented in table 1. 
 
Sugar quotas and fill ratios 
Also as illustrated in table 1, the U.S. establishes separate TRQs for imports of sugar and imports 
of sugar containing (processed) products such as syrups, molasses and other processed food. 
Raw sugar is imported via country-designated licenses to 40 countries, which are announced 
each year (table 2 presents allocations for 2003-2007 and table 3 presents them for 2008).  The 
allocation of export licenses is based on U.S. imports during 1975-1981, a period when trade was 
relatively unrestricted (Haley and Ali, 2007). Because this quota is granted to specific suppliers 
and may only be filled with the suppliers’ own sugar production, it is called a supplier tariff-rate 
quota (Skully, 1998). For refined sugar and other sugar containing products a single quota exists 
and is available on a first-come-first-served basis.  
 
The largest quotas are assigned to Brazil, the Dominican Republic, and the Philippines, with 
TRQs between 142,000 and 185,000 MT in 2009 followed by  Australia and Guatemala with 
87,000 and 51,000 MT each. Together these five countries account for over 55 percent of the 
total allocation of raw sugar quotas. In addition to the 40 countries that are entitled to supply raw 
sugar under a quota allocation, sugar is supplied by Mexico who as members of the North 
America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) are facing no import restrictions. Not all countries 
will indeed fill their quotas. Between 2006 and 2009, between 23 and 48 percent of the countries 
with TRQ allocations under the WTO did not ship any sugar (or less than 3 percent of the 
permitted amount) to the U.S. The willingness to supply the U.S. with sugar is linked to the price 
of sugar with respect to transportation costs. The world sugar price is typically around 6 cent per 
lb below the U.S. sugar price.  However, the gap can be as large as 15 cents (as is the case in 
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 early 2010). If the world price is high as well as transportation costs, suppliers may decide to sell 
their sugar closer to home. This has been true for several sub-Saharan African countries such as 
Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, and Madagascar.  Several Caribbean countries such as Barbados, 
Haiti, and Trinidad-Tobago have also failed to fulfill their quota in recent years. Of the 40 
countries with TRQ allocations
1 only 40 percent filled their entire quota
2 in 2009, down from 70 
percent in 2006, when sugar prices were lower.  
 
The concept of fill rate with respect to allocated quota is an important one as trade liberalization 
scenarios are based on the assumption that suppliers are interested in exporting more sugar to the 
U.S. in the case of increased quota allocations or lower over-quota tariffs. The most cost efficient 
producers do fulfill their quotas and are likely suppliers of sugar in the event that their access to 
the U.S. market increases. We use fill ratios to identify the particular regime an exporters faces: 
(i) within-quota shipments for countries that ship raw sugar cane, but do not fulfill their quota 
(regime 1 or line 2 in figure 4); (ii) at the quota limit shipments for those countries that fulfill 
their quota completely, but do not ship at the over-quota tariff rate (regime 2 or line 3 in figure 
4); and over-quota shipments (regime 3 or line 4 in figure 4). 
 
The model: concept and implementation 
This section describes the concept and implementation of a partial equilibrium (PE) model of 
world sugar and confectionary trade at the 6-digit level of the Harmonized Commodity 
Description and Coding System (HS) that is nested in a standard general equilibrium (GE) 
model.  Import policy is generally defined at the tariff line
3.  Yet most analyses of trade 
liberalization are conducted at a much more aggregated level.  Computable General Equilibrium 
(CGE) models are universally susceptible to the problem of policy aggregation, i.e., being 
incapable of capturing the dynamics of a particular market because policies affecting specific 
commodities cannot be adequately accounted for.  Moreover, these models become increasingly 
irrelevant as policy negotiations intensify into sensitive sectors—individual commodities of great 
importance to a particular country. At this level of detail, countries employ a mix of standard and 
                                                 
1 Mexico is a special case of a country that has a TRQ allocation as part of the WTO allocations despite the fact that 
the NAFTA agreement gives Mexico free access to the U.S. market as of January 2008.  
2 These countries mostly filled their quota to 100%, but at least above 95%. 
3 Export subsidies and domestic support are usually defined at a higher level of aggregation. 
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 nonstandard policies such as tariff rate quotas (TRQs) geared toward a particular commodity 
identified at a 6-, 8-, or even 10-digit level of the harmonized system (HS), which are not well 
represented in current GE analyses.   
 
The model: an overview 
The sub-sector (PE) sugar and confectionary model is formulated as a mixed-complementarity 
program (MCP) and subsequently embedded in a slightly modified GTAP-in-GAMS (GE) model 
(Rutherford 2005).  The sub-sector products (34 of them) are essentially treated as additional 
GTAP sectors in the PE/GE model. Figure 3 provides a conceptual framework of the sub-sector 
sugar and confectionary model using the U.S. as the importing country and the Caribbean and 
Australia as representative exporting countries.  Sub-sector sugar products are produced using a 
constant elasticity of transformation (CET) function in each region that permits sugar capacity to 
be shifted between all 34 HS6 products (e.g. raw sugar and crisp-bread or chewing gum).  
Indeed, this multi-product industry potentially produces all 34 HS6 sugar related products. Sugar 
output is then shipped to the domestic market or exported abroad.  In this simplified example we 
only look at those exports destined to the United States. 
 
After sub-sector products are exported to the U.S. market they are consumed at the HS6 level 
where they substitute in a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function. Higher prices 
encourage more production (via the transformation function) and less consumption (via the 
substitution function). Similar to the standard GTAP model, sugar and confectionary products in 
the sub-sector model are differentiated by country of origin in the manner pioneered by 
Armington (1969). Products from different sources are substitutable and this substitutability is 
governed by the import-import elasticity of substitution (σ
MM). Imports from different sources 
are then aggregated into a composite import before substituting for domestic output.  In this CES 
nest composite imports substitute with domestic output based on the import-domestic elasticity 
of substitution (σ
DM). Finally, domestic output and composite imports are combined in a higher 
level CES nest where U.S. expenditure takes place.     
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The MCP formulation of the quota model 
Given the importance of sugar and confectionary products in U.S. imports we introduce several 
bilateral TRQ policies for this tariff line. Tariff-quota activities are based on the following 
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g,r,s) can be delivered as in-quota trade 
( ) facing an in-quota tariff rate (t
in) and quota rent ((P2-P1)*Q in figure 4) in the case of 
regime 2, or as out-of-quota trade ( ) facing a much higher tariff rate (t
out).  Note that in an 
MCP formulation, equation (1) determines the equilibrium product price ( ) in the 
destination (U.S.) market, inclusive of the in (t
in) or out-of quota (t
out) tariff rates and any quota 
rent all of which are source (r) and destination (s) specific. 
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Equilibrium in tariff-quota trade implies zero profits on exports, after appropriate distribution of 
quota rents, so the sub-sector quota model is augmented with a zero-profit constraint for each 
tariff quota activity.  Following the MCP convention (Rutherford 1995; vdM-B-M 2003), the 
zero-profit condition for in-quota trade (X
IQ) is: 
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 where  can only occur if   holds with strict equality. Quota rents are assumed 
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Analogously, the zero-profit condition for out-of-quota trade is: 
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equality. Note there are no quota rents on out-of-quota imports.   
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Implementation 
The PE sugar and confectionary model is developed from detailed information on trade and 
protection levels taken from the World Integrated trading System (WITS) database housed by the 
World Bank.  The model is then nested in the standard GTAP7 in GAMS model developed by 
Thomas Rutherford.  The base year of the PE data are averages of 2004-2006, while the GTAP 
(GE) component of the model is based on the year 2004.  The model is customized by selecting 
sectors and countries or regional country groups of interest in the sugar sector. Trade and 
protection data were obtained from the WITS database, quota allocations and actual sugar 
shipments were obtained from the United States Trade Representative (USTR) and fill ratios of 
allocated quotas were calculated. 
 
Sectors--The product selection for the PE model depends on the GTAP model sectors since the 
PE and GTAP (GE) models will be linked and must be reconciled in the calibration process.  For 
the sugar and confectionary model, we selected all tariff lines that fall under GTAP’s sugar 
(SGR) sector which comprises seven HS6 tariff lines.  In addition, we also selected several 
confectionary products in more processed form.  These lines fall under GTAP’s other food sector 
(OFD). However, 290 HS6 tariff lines map into GTAP’s OFD sector.  To make the PE model 
more tractable in the number of product lines, we disaggregated the 26 HS6 product lines that are 
part of confectionary products under other food (OFD) and aggregated the remaining 264 into an 
aggregate HS code called “all other OFD lines (ofdo)”.  In total we have 33 HS6 disaggregated 
sugar related product lines plus the aggregate “other food” sector in the PE comprising the SGR 
and OFD sectors of GTAP. Table 4 describes these 34 product lines. 
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Countries and country groups--Based on the relative importance of sugar (SGR) and other food 
(OFD) imports and exports, table 5 lists the country aggregations that are used in the model—10 
individual countries and 8 regional aggregates. These 18 countries/groups account for all 113 
countries in GTAP. Figure 1 graphs total imports and exports of all 34 sugar and confectionary 
products for each of the eighteen PE/GE model regions.  During our base period 2004-2006, 
EU25 members were the largest player in this market in terms of both imports and exports with 
imports totaling over $66 billion dollars and exports totaling over $71 billion. EU exports have 
since declined considerably and are only 42 percent of EU imports in 2009/10.  Rest of Asia 
(RAS), the United States (USA) and other Europe and Central Asia (ECA) followed the EU25 
member region by a large margin during our base period.   
 
An important component of the PE/GE model is that it can accurately represent the workings of 
tariff-rate quotas.  In the model we include bilateral quotas for one tariff line in the U.S. (raw 
sugar cane = rawc or HS170111).  Figures 2a and 2b graph the important export suppliers of raw 
sugar to the U.S. market.  Figure 2a depicts the individual countries while figure 2b shows 
exports from regional country groups used in this analysis. Not surprisingly, other Central 
America and Caribbean countries (CAC) and the Rest of South American (RSA), with Argentina 
and Peru as the region’s strongest sugar cane suppliers to the U.S., are the largest exporters to the 
U.S. quota constrained market for raw sugar with exports of over $140 and $70 million, 
respectively, in 2004-2006.  The Dominican Republic is the largest exporter of raw sugar to the 
U.S., accounting for almost 15 percent of the export market share from all sources.   The 
Dominican Republic is followed by Brazil (11.3%) and Guatemala (10%), two other Western 
Hemisphere low-cost sugar producers.       
 
Although TRQs are applied to virtually all sugar and confectionary lines, we focus on TRQs 
applied to raw sugar cane as this sector has detailed data on the method of TRQ administration 
(supplier quotas) and the quota levels allocated to each country. A unit problem arises because 
the PE/GE model data are in value terms whereas the quota information is in quantity units.  We 
therefore use fill ratios to identify the particular regime an exporters faces: (i) within-quota 
shipments (regime 1); (ii) at-the-quota-limit shipments (regime 2); and over-quota shipments 
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 (regime 3). These fill ratios and the associated in- and over-quota tariff rates are reported in 
Table 6.   
 
Perhaps not surprisingly, no country exceeds their country-designated quota allocation.  For 
several countries, however, the quota is ‘nearly’ binding – a situation captured by regime 2.   The 
calculated fill ratios for Australia, Brazil, Guatemala, India, and South Africa are 99 percent and 
several other countries have fill ratios over 96 percent. We follow Centre d’Etudes Prospectives 
et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII) and assume that fill ratios greater than 90 percent 
constitute a binding quota.  Clearly, with this assumption in mind, 10 out of the 13 
countries/regions shipping raw sugar cane and facing a TRQ in the U.S. market have a lot at 
stake when it comes to liberalizing U.S. raw sugar TRQs. 
   
Model calibration 
Model calibration requires that we ensure consistency of the sub-sector data with the GE model, 
which cannot be taken for granted since PE data and GE data come from different sources. Data 
reconciliation between the two model components is required for trade data and also for taxes 
and revenue or quota rents from TRQs. Furthermore, domestic demand and supply for the PE 
model need to be imputed as this kind of data is typically not available at the HS6-digit level. We 
use a nonlinear optimization procedure which recovers domestic demand information from each 
country’s import intensity targets. Parameters such as elasticities were either estimated 
econometrically or they reflect sector specific assumptions. The elasticity of transformation 
governs the ease with which countries can transform their sectoral SGR or OFD output into one 
of the 34 HS6-digit products described in Section I (see also table 1).  Because most HS6-digit 
SGR products share the same basic input (raw sugar) we believe this transformation elasticity is 
quite large and therefore set it equal to 8.0, in absolute value.  The elasticity of substitution in 
final consumption (σ
C) refers to the responsiveness of final consumers in choosing between HS6-
digit sugar (SGR) and other food (OFD) products.  While this elasticity is surely larger than that 
between SGR products and other sectors, such as cereals, at the GTAP level, we believe it is not 
nearly as large as the transformation elasticity on the supply side and set it equal to one.  The 
elasticity of substitution between imports from different sources (σ
MM) has been econometrically 
estimated to be 5.4 for the GTAP model.  However, in estimating this GTAP parameter the 
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 estimates are based on comparably disaggregated trade data (HS6-level), but the Armington 
parameter in that study was constrained to be equal for all product lines within the SGR sector.  
It is likely that the import-import substitution elasticity varies considerably between relatively 
homogeneous products such as raw sugar cane (rawc), and more differentiated products such as 
cereal foods prepared by swelling or roasting (cerf).  Thus, while the value of the sectoral level 
SGR import-import elasticity remains the same as is in the GTAP model (5.4), we allow the 
import-import elasticity between HS6-digit SGR and OFD lines in the PE model to be twice that 
of the GTAP elasticity (5.4*2 = 10.8) which is the elasticity of substitution across import sources 
(σ
MM) at the HS6-digit level and k indexes HS6-digit products. The import-domestic elasticity of 
substitution (the so-called Armington elasticity) σ
DM is set to equal half the value of σ
MM, or 5.4.   
 
Increasing access to sugar: economics of TRQs, scenarios, and results 
The conventional method for handling TRQs in a trade model has been to begin with a step-like 
excess supply curve and assume a downward sloping excess demand curve (figure 4).   
The TRQ entails a lower in-quota tariff (t) levied on imports that enter the country within a set 
quota level (Q), and a higher tariff (T) applied on imports beyond the quota level.  This can be 
represented as given in figure 4 which has been adapted from Skully (2001).  If the excess 
demand curve is given by line 1 and world prices are w, no imports take place as indicated by M1 
= 0.  But if the excess demand curve intersects the supply curve = P1 (the prevailing import price 
in the importing country when the import quota is not binding) then the quantity imported lies 
between the M1 and the quota quantity Q.  This is presented in the figure with the example of 
line 2 and import quantity M2.  The case of a binding quota is depicted by the excess demand line 
3.  At this level, import demand is high enough to generate a quota rent R, and the prevailing 
import price for the product is now P2.  But the demand is not high enough to increase the 
quantity imported beyond Q because to do so would require importing products at the price of P3 
which is the sum of world price w and the over-quota tariff T.  When the excess demand curve 
further shifts out as illustrated with line 4, importers are now willing to buy the product with the 
over-quota tariff at a higher price of P3.  The quantity imported is then M4, a quantity larger than 
the quota Q.  Quota rent is the maximum possible under a TRQ, equivalent to (P3-P1)* Q. This 
rent needs to be rationed, and it is the distribution of rents that determines potential winners and 
losers. The method of quota administration generally determines the allocation of quota rents 
13 
 (Skully, 2001) and in the case of historical allocation the rents accrue to the holders of quota 
licences.   
 
As evident from figure 1, depending on the position of excess demand curve 3, the size of the 
quota rent R can vary and subsequently the import price P2 can also vary.  Given fill ratios of 
close to 100 percent we assume that in this sugar analysis the majority of exporters find 
themselves in a situation represented by line 3. The model presented here is capable of 
determining the value of the tariff-quota rents on a bilateral basis. The model is furthermore 
capable of showing when rents disappear.  
 
Scenarios and results 
We examined various liberalization scenarios that had differing degrees of trade and welfare 
impacts. The two scenarios we are presenting here illustrate the varying impact of the two policy 
tools quota versus tariff rate.  In scenario one, we cut over-quota tariffs by 25% and expand 
quotas by 50%.  In the second scenario, we cut over-quota tariffs by 50% and expand quotas by 
25%.  The first scenario could be interpreted as a representation of a case in which sugar were to 
be declared a sensitive commodity, in which case over-quota tariffs would have to undergo 
relatively smaller cuts while quota levels would have to be increased relatively more. 
 
Figure 5 below reports the welfare results in percentage changes of sugar consumption.  Three 
important findings emerge.  First, the welfare changes are larger and more significant under 
scenario 2 which cuts over-quota tariffs relatively more than the expansion in bilateral raw sugar 
quotas.  This is because reductions in over-quota tariffs cut immediately into prices such that the 
U.S. can import raw sugar from relatively cheaper sources compared to domestic production.   
Expansions in quotas on the other hand (unless they are binding and force exporters to change 
regimes) do not affect prices. Second, changes in welfare as a percent of sugar consumption are 
relatively small for many countries.  However, in Brazil and Guatemala the changes are large 
suggesting that these two countries have a lot to gain when it comes to liberalizing raw sugar 









sugar sector. There are positive welfare effects under both scenarios, but the welfare gain is 
stronger under scenario 2, the case of more drastic over-quota tariff reduction. The percentage 
change in welfare measured as a percentage of U.S. sugar consumption is 4%, or roughly $44 
million in 2004, mainly due to the reduction in price which increases consumer welfare 
sufficiently. 
 
Figure 6 graphs the output response from liberalizing U.S. raw sugar quotas according to 
scenarios 1 and 2.  Here we report the total response of the sugar sector, and not the response of 
the individual HS6-tariff line (rawc).  With the exception of other Central America and 
Caribbean countries (CAC), the output responses are much greater under scenario 2 because 
reducing the over-quota tariff by 50% as compared to 25% has a more immediate impact on 
prices. South Africa and Canada see the largest output response from liberalizing U.S. raw sugar 
quotas. 
 
Finally, figure 6 plots the dollar value of U.S. imports from each source country.  We have to be 
careful in interpreting these numbers because the large bilateral trade values between the U.S and 
CAC, Canada, and the EU25 dwarfs the impact in other countries.  However, the bilateral trade 
response from TRQ liberalization is again greatest under scenario 2 which cuts over-quota tariffs 




Market access for agricultural products will continue to be an important issue during future 
multilateral trade negotiations. Sugar remains one of the most protected commodities and 
therefore exporters as well as the U.S. as one of the largest importers need to have information 
on likely outcomes of possible liberalization scenarios. The model presented here combines a 
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 detailed partial equilibrium sector model that incorporates trade policy defined at the tariff line 
with a general equilibrium model that encompasses world trade. This PE/GE approach avoids 
misrepresenting the trade impacts due to excessive aggregation. Of particular value in the sugar 
sector is the fact that our model is capable to capturing bilateral trade policy by explicitly 
allowing for differing quotas and tariff rates between the U.S. and its various trade partners.  
 
Trade liberalization can take different forms and often a combination of policy tools is chosen. 
The final outcome often depends on the relative weight each of these tools is given. We compare 
two scenarios that give different weights to the two tools: extending quota levels or reducing 
over-quota tariff rates. Our results show that welfare benefits of lowering over-quota tariffs 
exceed those of increasing quota levels for most important sugar exporters. This result also holds 
for the U.S., an important sugar producing and importing country.  
 
Further investigation: 
This project is still in its beginning stages. Interesting extensions would be to add refined sugar 
policy data with the same kind of detail that we have for raw cane sugar. Countries such as 
Mexico, the Dominican Republic or other countries of interest could be taken out of their group 
so that their trade and welfare impacts could be analyzed at a country rather than regional level. 
Furthermore it would be valuable to try to include domestic U.S. policy with respect the 
government’s program to buy sugar and sell it to the ethanol producers whenever the price falls 
below a threshold level. Incorporating this kind of policy detail helps gain a better understanding 
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Table 1--Average U.S. MFN Tariff on Sugar and Sugar Containing Products (Estimated) 
   In-quota   Non-TRQ or over-quota 
      --Percent--    
Beet & can sugar (raw)  7.5  165.0 
Beet & can sugar (refined)  5.9  153.0 
Other Sweeteners  4.4  27.1 
   --Sugar containing products 
Nonalcoholic beverages  5.0  30.8 
Cocoa powder and products  6.1  27.4 
Other prepared food  8.4     33.6    
Source: Calculations by USDA, Economic Research Service, using AMAD  








































 Table 2.  Tariff-Quota Allocations by Country and Year (2004-2007) 
 
Country 2004  2005  2006  2007  2007  Shar
Argentina  45,281 54,171 77,258 55,112  4.12%
Australia 87,402  104,561  149,126  106,378  7.96%
Barbados 7,371  0 0  8,972  0.67%
Belize  11,583 13,857 19,764 14,098  1.05%
Bolivia 8,424  10,078  14,374  10,253  0.77%
Brazil  152,691 182,668 260,521 185,841  13.90%
Colombia  25,273 30,235 43,121 30,760  2.30%
Congo 7,258  7,258  7,258  7,258  0.54%
Costa  Rica  15,796 15,796 26,950 19,225  1.44%
Cote D'Ivoire  7,258  7,258  7,258  7,258  0.54%
Dominican  Republic  185,335 186,555 252,935 225,573  16.87%
Ecuador  11,583 13,857 19,764 14,098  1.05%
El  Salvador  27,379 32,754 46,714 33,323  2.49%
Fiji 9,477  11,338  12,934  11,535  0.86%
Gabon 7,258  0  0  7,258  0.54%
Guatemala  50,546 60,469 86,242 61,520  4.60%
Guyana  12,636 15,117 21,560 15,380  1.15%
Haiti 7,258  0  0  7,258  0.54%
Honduras  10,530 12,597 17,967 12,817  0.96%
India 8,424  164  11,497  10,253  0.77%
Jamaica 11,583  2,950  19,764  14,098  1.05%
Madagascar 7,258  7,258  7,258  7,258  0.54%
Malawi  10,530 10,530 17,967 12,817  0.96%
Mauritius  12,636 15,117 21,560 15,380  1.15%
Mexico 6/  7,258  7,258  0  0  0.00%
Mozambique  13,690 16,378 23,357 16,662  1.25%
Nicaragua  22,114 26,456 37,731 26,915  2.01%
Panama  30,538 36,533 52,105 37,168  2.78%
Papua New Guinea  7,258  7,258  7,258  7,258  0.54%
Paraguay 7,258  7,258  7,258  7,258  0.54%
Peru  43,175 51,651 73,665 52,548  3.93%
Philippines  142,160 142,160 224,012 173,025  12.94%
South  Africa  24,220 28,975 41,324 29,478  2.21%
St.Kitts and Nevis  7,258  0  0  7,258  0.54%
Swaziland  16,849 20,157 28,747 20,507  1.53%
Taiwan  12,636 15,117 13,953 15,380  1.15%
Thailand  14,743 17,637 25,154 17,943  1.34%
Trinidad-Tobago 7,371  0  12,577 8,972  0.67%
Uruguay 7,258  7,258  7,258  7,258  0.54%
Zimbabwe  12,636 15,117 21,560 15,380  1.15%
 






 Table 3. U.S. Raw Sugar TRQ Allocations for Fiscal Year 2008.
Countries Metric Tons  Countries Metric Tons
Raw Sugar (General)  Raw Sugar (under NAFTA)
Argentina  45,281 Mexico 177,954
Australia  87,402
Barbados  7,371  Refined Sugar
Belize 11,583 Refined Global 7,090
Bolivia  8,424  Refined Canada 10,300
Brazil 152,691 Refined Specialty 65,159
Colombia 25,273 Total Refined TRQ  82,549
Congo  7,258 
Cote D'Ivoire 7,258  Refined Sugar (under CAFTA)
Costa Rica  15,796 CAFTA TRQs (Calendar Year 2008)
Dominican Republic  185,335 El Salvador 24,960
Ecuador 11,583 Nicaragua 22,880
El Salvador  27,379 Honduras 8,320
Fiji 9,477  Guatemala 33,280
Gabon  7,258  Total CAFTA 89,440
Guatemala  50,546
Guyana 12,636
Haiti  7,258 
Honduras 10,530








Papua New Guinea  7,258 












Total Raw Cane TRQ 1110359 All TRQ Sugar 1,460,302








rawc  170111  SGR  Raw cane sugar (excl. added flavouring or colouring) 
rawb  170112  SGR  Raw beet sugar (excl. added flavouring or colouring) 
rfcb  170191  SGR  Refined cane or beet sugar, containing added flavouring or colouring, in solid form 
sucr 170199  SGR 
Cane or beet sugar and chemically pure sucrose, in solid form (excl. cane and beet 
sugar containing added flavouring or colouring and raw sugar) 
mapl  170220  SGR  Maple sugar, in solid form, and maple syrup (excl. flavoured or coloured) 
glus 170230  OFD  Glucose, glucose syrup < 20% fructose 
gluo 170240  OFD  Glucose including syrup of 20%-50% dry weight fructose 
frus 170250  OFD  Fructose, chemically pure 
fruo 170260  OFD  Fructose, syrup > 50% fructose, not pure fructose 
snes 170290  OFD  Sugar nes, invert sugar, caramel and artificial honey 
cmol  170310  SGR  Cane molasses resulting from the extraction or refining of sugar 
bmol  170390  SGR  Beet molasses resulting from the extraction or refining of sugar 
gumc 170410  OFD  Chewing gum containing sugar, except medicinal 
sugo 170490  OFD  Sugar confectionery not chewing gum, no cocoa content 
cocp 180610  OFD  Cocoa powder, sweetened 
cocc 180620  OFD  Chocolate and other food preps containing cocoa > 2 kg 
cocf 180631  OFD  Chocolate, cocoa preps, block, slab, bar, filled, >2kg 
cocu 180632  OFD  Chocolate, cocoa prep, block/slab/bar, not filled,>2kg 
coco 180690  OFD  Chocolate/cocoa food preparations nes 
inff 190110  OFD  Infant foods of cereals, flour, starch or milk, retail 
doug 190120  OFD  Mixes and dough for bread, pastry, biscuits, etc. 
malt 190190  OFD  Malt extract & limited cocoa pastry cooks products nes 
cerf 190410  OFD  Cereal foods obtained by swelling, roasting of cereal 
ceru 190420  OFD  Prep foods from unroasted 
crib 190510  OFD  Crisp-bread 
ginb 190520  OFD  Gingerbread and the like 
wafr 190590  OFD  Communion wafers, rice paper, bakers wares nes 
cofe 210112  OFD  Coffee prep. of extracts 
cofx 210120  OFD  Tea and mate extracts, essences and concentrates 
tomk 210320  OFD  Tomato ketchup and other tomato sauces 
saun 210390  OFD  Sauces nes, mixed condiments, mixed seasoning 
hcfp 210420  OFD  Homogenized composite food preparations 
foon 210690  OFD  Food preparations nes 
ofdo 999999  OFD  All Other OFD Lines 







 Table 5. Model Countries 
Number  ISO Code  Country Name 
1 AUS  Australia 
2 BRA  Brazil 
3 CAN  Canada 
4 IND  India 
5 MEX  Mexico 
6 MUS  Mauritius 
7 THA  Thailand 
8 USA  United  States 
9 GTM  Guatemala 
10 ZAF  South  Africa 
11  CAC  Central America and Caribbean 
12  ECA  Europe and Central Asia 
13  EU25  European Union 25 Members 
14  RAS  Rest of Asia 
15  ROW  Rest of World (Oceania and Micronesia) 
16  RSA  Rest of South America 
17  RSS  Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa 






Table 6.  TRQ Fill Ratios by Country/Region 
Country/Region  Filling Rate (2004-06) In-Quota Tariff 
Over-Quota 
Tariff 
AUS 0.990  0.032  0.782 
BRA 0.990  0.033  0.816 
CAC 0.964  0.033  0.807 
GTM 0.990  0.039  0.955 
IND 0.990  0.012  0.297 
MEX 0.360  0.023  0.557 
MUS 0.710  0.027  0.658 
RAS 0.969  0.025  0.621 
ROW 0.976  0.034  0.837 
RSA 0.979  0.034  0.826 
RSS 0.796  0.033  0.815 
THA  0.940  0.035    0.865 
ZAF 0.990  0.085  2.084 








































































Figure 2a.  U.S. Imports of Raw Sugar Cane by Source, 2004-2006 





















Source: WITS database, accessed October 2008. 
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 Figure 2b: 
 
 




 Figure 3.  Conceptual Framework of the Sub-Sector Sugar and Confectionary Model  
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Notes: The parameter σ




enter the CES nest and depict substitution possibilities across import sources (σ
MM), between domestic and imported 
goods (σ














 Figure 4. Import Demand With Tariff-Rate Quotas   
w 
P1 = w+t
S =w + T  











M  2  M 1  4 3
Source: Based on Skully, 2001. p. 2  
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